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S ociologists and political scientists have often observed that citizens of Central and Eastern Europe express high levelsof disillusionment with their social, economic and political systems, in comparison with citizens of Western capitalist
societies. In this review, we analyze system legitimation and delegitimation in post-Communist societies from a social
psychological perspective. We draw on system justification theory, which seeks to understand how, when and why people
do (and do not) defend, bolster and justify existing social systems. We review some of the major tenets and findings of the
theory and compare research on system-justifying beliefs and ideologies in traditionally Capitalist and post-Communist
countries to determine: (1) whether there are robust differences in the degree of system justification in post-Communist
and Capitalist societies, and (2) the extent to which hypotheses derived from system justification theory receive support
in the post-Communist context. To this end, we summarize research findings from over 20 countries and cite previously
unpublished data from a public opinion survey conducted in Poland. Our analysis confirms that there are lower levels of
system justification in post-Communist countries. At the same time, we find that system justification possesses similar
social and psychological antecedents, manifestations and consequences in the two types of societies. We offer potential
explanations for these somewhat complicated patterns of results and conclude by addressing implications for theory and
research on system justification and system change (or transition).
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Va´clav Havel, the dissident playwright who became
the first President of the Czech Republic in the post-
Communist period, was once asked how he had felt during
the public meetings of 1968 that sparked the movement
of opposition to the Soviet regime. He responded that he
had experienced, first and foremost, joy and satisfaction.
Then he continued:
But I also felt a strange sadness. It was a sadness that
came from the spectacle of people who were bound by
the ruling ideology clarifying for themselves, after twenty
years of rule, things that had been clear to everyone else
all through those twenty years. The sadness came from the
very reasons for my joy. (Havel, 1990a, p. 97)
Havel aptly characterized the conundrum facing citizens
of post-Communist societies. On one hand, a bright new
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future seemed possible for the nation (and the region).
On the other hand, it was painful to bear witness to the
disintegration of familiar, longstanding institutions and
ideologies.
The early 1990s in Central and Eastern Europe ushered
in freedom from Communism and, with it, extremely
ambitious social, economic and political aspirations for
the future. Most observers would have predicted that the
free market system, which was greeted enthusiastically
at the outset, would enjoy the support of citizens of
formerly Communist countries for years to come. This,
however, is not what has transpired. Compared with more
traditional Capitalist democracies in the West, citizens of
Central and Eastern Europe have expressed considerable
disillusionment with the “new” system (e.g., Kluegel,
Mason, & Wegener, 1995; Markova, 2004; Wojciszke,
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2007). Faith in the old system was fatally shaken, but it
is far from clear that newer ideological confidences have
risen to fill the void. Or, as Havel (1990b) summed up the
post-Communist dilemma: “People have passed through
a very dark tunnel at the end of which there was a light
of freedom. Unexpectedly they passed through the prison
gates and found themselves in a square. They are now
free and they don’t know where to go” (p. 10).
INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW
Sociologists and political scientists have often noted the
low levels of perceived system legitimacy that have
characterized post-Communist societies (e.g., Czapin´ski,
2011; Kluegel, Mason, et al., 1995; Markova, 2004;
Tworzecki, 2008). However, psychological analyses that
focus on specific cognitive and motivational processes to
explain the lack of support for the present system have
been hard to come by (but see Hunyady, 2002, 2009; van
der Toorn, Berkics, & Jost, 2010; Wojciszke, 2007). In
this article, we seek to fill this gap by reviewing research
on system legitimation and delegitimation from a social
psychological perspective, occasionally supplementing
our review with public opinion data and findings from
neighbouring disciplines in the social sciences.
The basic framework for this article is derived from
system justification theory, which seeks to understand
how, when and why people do and do not support
existing social systems, sometimes even to their
own detriment (Jost, Banaji, & Nosek, 2004). We
start with a brief summary of major findings from
various Capitalist countries. Generally, these findings
are consistent with the notion that people are motivated
to defend, bolster and justify the social, economic and
political systems on which they depend. Afterwards,
we consider research on system-justifying beliefs and
ideologies in post-Communist countries with the aim
of determining: (1) whether there are robust differences
in the degree of system justification in post-Communist
and Capitalist societies and (2) the extent to which system
justification in the two types of societies possesses similar
social and psychological antecedents, manifestations and
consequences.
To this end we summarize research findings from over
20 countries, including manuscripts published in five
different languages (English, German, Hungarian, Polish
and Spanish). We also cite previously unpublished data
obtained from a recent public opinion survey focusing
on the legitimation and delegitimation of the social and
political system in one of the largest post-Communist
countries, namely Poland. Our approach allows us to
synthesize findings from diverse sources, many of which
tend to be overlooked in English-language publications.
Regrettably, attempting to cover such a vast array of
materials necessitates some degree of over-simplification.
While we acknowledge the rich and varied historical and
cultural backgrounds of specific nations in Central and
Eastern Europe (as well as those of Western Capitalist
nations), we seek to extrapolate commonalities, focusing
on shared rather than unshared characteristics of both
types of societies.
SYSTEM JUSTIFICATION THEORY: EVIDENCE
FROM CAPITALIST SOCIETIES
System justification theory, which was originally
formulated by Jost and Banaji (1994), proposes that
just as individuals are motivated to hold favourable
attitudes about themselves and the social groups to
which they belong, they are also motivated to hold
favourable attitudes towards the social, economic and
political systems in which they live and work (see also
Jost et al., 2004; Jost & van der Toorn, 2012). As noted by
Sidanius and Pratto (1999), such systems are more often
than not organized hierarchically—with some individuals
and groups controlling or dominating others (even in
ostensibly egalitarian systems, such as Communism).
Therefore, the system justification motive typically leads
members of the system to defend and perpetuate social
and economic forms of inequality, even if the inequality is
disadvantageous to the self and/or in-group (e.g., Henry
& Saul, 2006; Jost & Hunyady, 2005; Jost, Pelham,
Sheldon, & Sullivan, 2003; Olson, Dweck, Spelke, &
Banaji, 2011).
Presumably, individuals engage in system justification
because it satisfies a number of basic psychological
motivations. To begin with, justifying the existing system
can satisfy individuals’ epistemic needs by allowing them
to believe that they are operating in a stable, familiar,
predictable, controllable environment. In this way, system
justification serves to reduce feelings of uncertainty,
randomness and uncontrollability (Jost&Hunyady, 2005;
Kay et al., 2009). Second, system justification satisfies
existential motives by helping individuals to cope with
potential threats. Thus, it maintains the conviction that
the status quo is not only predictable but also safe,
reassuring and benevolent (Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, &
Sulloway, 2003; Ullrich & Cohrs, 2007). Finally, system
justification satisfies relational motives by providing
people with a sense of belongingness and shared reality
with valued others, including friends and family members
(Jost, Ledgerwood, & Hardin, 2008). In principle, a
sense of shared reality can be achieved by subscribing
to virtually any type of belief system. In practice,
however, there are reasons to think that relational motives
are especially likely to inspire commitment to system-
justifying ideologies, insofar as it is easier to establish
shared reality and ideological conformity with respect to
traditional, mainstream ideas that are congruent (rather
than incongruent) with the status quo.
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Although epistemic, existential and relational needs
are thought to contribute to a general preference for
system justification (e.g., see Hennes, Nam, Stern, &
Jost, 2012), individuals are expected to differ in the
extent to which they are motivated to justify a given
system that affects them (Jost & Hunyady, 2005; Jost
et al., 2010; Kay & Friesen, 2011). Exposure to criticism
or threats directed at the legitimacy or stability of the
social system—as demonstrated in Israel (Jost, Kivetz,
Rubini, Guermandi, & Mosso, 2005), the U.S. (Kay,
Jost, & Young, 2005) and Germany (Ullrich & Cohrs,
2007)—as well as feelings of system dependence—as
demonstrated in Canada (Kay et al., 2009) and the U.S.
(van der Toorn, Tyler, & Jost, 2011)—and perceptions
of inevitability in the U.S. (Kay, Jimenez, & Jost, 2002)
and inescapability in Canada (Laurin, Shepherd, & Kay,
2010) tend to activate or increase the motivation to justify
the societal status quo.
System-justifying ideologies
System justification motivation can be manifested in
various ways. The most direct manifestation is the
explicit endorsement of ideologies that defend, bolster
and justify the status quo (Jost & Hunyady, 2005;
Major et al., 2002; Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle,
1994). Which ideologies are to be considered system-
justifying (vs. system-challenging) may differ (at least
somewhat) as a function of specific features of the social,
economic and political context. However, according
to system justification theory, there is a specific set
of belief systems that have in common the fact that
they contribute moral and intellectual legitimacy to the
societal status quo (Jost & Hunyady, 2005). Examples of
system-justifying ideologies in contemporary Western
societies include meritocratic belief systems (which
assume that individual attainment is [in practice] based
purely on merit—talent and motivation—rather than
luck or preferential treatment); the protestant work ethic
(which promises that industriousness and related virtues
will always be rewarded); the American Dream (which
holds that everyone in the U.S. has a fair and equal
chance to succeed and prosper); the belief in a just world
(according to which people get what they deserve and
deserve what they get); fair market ideology, which
assumes that market-based procedures and outcomes
are not only efficient but fair and just; and political
conservatism, including support for traditional norms,
values, and institutions and tolerance of hierarchy and
inequality (e.g., see Jost, Blount, Pfeffer, & Hunyady,
2003; Jost, Glaser, et al., 2003).
Ideologies such as these tend to be fairly widespread
among members of society. Importantly, they are
1This study was conducted in 1999, 6 years prior to the election of Evo Morales (a Mestizo) to the presidency of Bolivia.
often endorsed not only by individuals with power,
prestige and privilege (i.e. those who directly and
unequivocally benefit from maintaining the status quo).
Members of disadvantaged social groups also sometimes
engage in system justification, even when this means
legitimizing inequality and policies that work to their
own disadvantage (e.g., Jost, Pelham, et al., 2003;
O’Brien, Major, & Gilbert, 2012). It would appear
that system justification addresses the same set of
epistemic, existential and relational needs for members
of disadvantaged as well as advantaged groups. A
counterintuitive implication of system justification theory
is that those who are especially disadvantaged by
and dependent upon the status quo are sometimes its
most ardent defenders, as demonstrated in the U.S.
(Jost, Pelham, et al., 2003; van der Toorn et al., in
press). Enhanced system justification on the part of the
disadvantaged may be driven by the need to reduce
cognitive dissonance associated with participating in a
system that is personally costly (e.g., Blanton, George, &
Crocker, 2001; Jost, Pelham, et al., 2003; but see Brandt,
2013, for a critique of this idea).
One of the most striking demonstrations of this
phenomenon was provided by Henry and Saul (2006),
who studied children belonging to different ethnic groups
in Bolivia, which is one of the poorest countries in the
world. Results revealed that—compared to high status
Spanish descendants and mixed-race Mestizos—the
lowest status group of Indigenous Bolivians was least
likely to criticize the government and most likely to
believe that the government takes care of all of its
citizens.1
Internalization of the status quo
System justification tendencies are manifested not only in
explicit, declarative support for regimes and ideologies.
Insofar as it serves to satisfy basic psychological needs,
individuals (more often than not) internalize the norms,
values and practices associated with the current system.
As a result, the disadvantaged frequently internalize
their position in the social order. In other words, they
embrace (in some respects) their assumed inferiority and
even perpetuate it in various ways. For instance, research
conducted in the U.S. has demonstrated that members
of low status groups such as women (among others)
exhibit a sense of “depressed entitlement,” expecting
lesser compensation and even “paying themselves” less
than men for work of equal quality (e.g., Blanton et al.,
2001; Jost, 1997; Major, 1994; Pelham & Hetts, 2001).
O’Brien et al. (2012) demonstrated that priming men and
women with system-justifying beliefs exacerbates the
gender gap with respect to perceived entitlement.
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The internalization of the social order is also
reflected in individuals’ attitudes towards the social
groups to which they do and do not belong. When
system justification motivation is high, members of
disadvantaged groups are likely to engage in out-group
favouritism—“the expression of an evaluative preference
for members of a group to which one does not belong”
(Jost et al., 2004, p. 891; see also Jost, Pelham,&Carvallo,
2002). Out-group favouritism among the disadvantaged
has been observed in a wide variety of intergroup
contexts. Nosek, Banaji, and Greenwald (2002) found
that whereas African Americans exhibited strong in-
group bias at an explicit level, their implicit attitudes
revealed a very different pattern. Nearly half of African
American respondents exhibited a tendency to favour the
White (EuropeanAmerican) out-group (see alsoAshburn-
Nardo, Knowles, & Monteith, 2003; Jost et al., 2004;
Livingston, 2002). Implicit out-group preferences have
also been observed with respect to poor (vs. rich) people
(Rudman, Feinberg, & Fairchild, 2002), ethnic minorities
(vs. majorities) in the U.S. (Jost et al., 2002) and Chile
(Uhlmann, Dasgupta, Elgueta, Greenwald, & Swanson,
2002), gay men and lesbians (Jost et al., 2004), and many
other disadvantaged groups (e.g., see Jost et al., 2002,
2004).
Complementary stereotyping
One way in which individuals seem to cope with
potentially negative views of themselves and their groups
is by endorsing “complementary stereotypes” (Kay &
Jost, 2003). Stereotypes are not merely reflections
of group attributes; they are also justifications or
rationalizations of the target group’s position in society
(Allport, 1954; Jost & Banaji, 1994). In the case of
complementary stereotypes, members of advantaged
and disadvantaged groups are regarded as “possessing
distinctive, offsetting strengths and weaknesses” (Kay
& Jost, 2003, p. 825). Such a belief system encourages
the assumption that every group in society is receiving
a fair share of benefits and costs, whether there are
downsides to being privileged or perquisites associated
with being underprivileged. For instance, men are often
seen as more competent but less warm than women, and
the rich are sometimes seen as less happy or honest than
the poor. Experiments conducted in the U.S. and Canada
demonstrate that exposure to statements claiming that
positive and negative characteristics are distributed more
or less equally across social groups makes people feel
better about the status quo (e.g., Jost & Kay, 2005).
2We are not suggesting that preferences for a meritocratic system (as opposed to, say, a nepotistic or plutocratic system) are in themselves
system-justifying. Rather, we are suggesting that processes of system justification are involved in the endorsement and espousal of ideologies
which assume (in their purest form) that—in terms of actual societal practice—social and economic outcomes are distributed only on the basis of
considerations of merit (hard work, talent, ambition, preparation, etc.) and that luck and preferential treatment play no meaningful role whatsoever.
Such complementarity is a core feature of paternalistic
and envious stereotypes—seemingly ambivalent beliefs
about social groups that serve a system legitimizing
function (e.g., Cuddy, Fiske, & Glick, 2007). Envious
stereotypes are typically reserved for higher status groups,
which tend to be perceived as competent but cold.
Paternalistic stereotypes, on the other hand, assume
high warmth but low competence of a low status
group. The most common example of paternalistic
attitudes is probably benevolent sexism—a conviction
that women “ought to be protected, supported, and
adored,” which “implies that they are weak and best
suited for conventional gender roles” (Glick & Fiske,
2001, p. 109).
Jost et al. (2005) demonstrated in various societal
contexts that complementary stereotyping increases under
conditions of heightened system justification motivation.
In Italy, for instance, perceptions of large (vs. small)
status differences between Southerners (lower status)
and Northerners (higher status) were accompanied by
complementary stereotypes, so that Northerners were
seen as more agentic than Southerners and Southerners
were seen as more communal than Northerners. These
stereotypes, in turn, were associated with greater system
justification. Parallel results have been observed in the
U.K., American and Israeli contexts (e.g., Jost, Burgess,
& Mosso, 2001; Jost et al., 2005).
Palliative function of system justification
By satisfying psychological needs of both the advantaged
and disadvantaged, system justification serves a palliative
function by “making people feel better about their
situation regardless of what this situation may be” (Jost
& Hunyady, 2002, p. 146). By believing that they live in
“the best of all possible worlds” (Leibniz, 1710/1985, p.
228) members of both high and low status groups may
experience a short-term boost to their subjective well-
being, manifested in terms of increased positive affect
and decreased negative effect. In the simplest terms,
justifying the status quo has the potential to make people
feel happier and more satisfied.
The palliative effects of system justification have
been observed frequently in Western societies. In a
study by Jost, Pelham, et al. (2003), endorsement
of meritocratic ideology predicted greater satisfaction
with one’s economic situation for rich and poor
respondents (see also Kluegel & Smith, 1986).2 Several
studies suggest that subscribing to the protestant work
ethic and the belief in a just world are associated
© 2013 International Union of Psychological Science
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with greater life satisfaction in the U.S. (e.g., Blood,
1969) and Portugal (Correia, Batista, & Lima, 2009).
Napier and Jost (2008) observed that in 10 countries
(including Finland, Germany, New Zealand, Norway,
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the U.S., as well
as two post-Communist countries, namely the Czech
Republic and Slovakia) the differential endorsement of
meritocratic, system-justifying beliefs helps to explain
why conservatives are happier than liberals. These results
have been replicated repeatedly (e.g., Choma, Busseri,
& Sadava, 2009; Schlenker, Chambers, & Le, 2012, see
especially their Tables 1 and 5).
At the same time, not everyone benefits to the same
degree from engaging in system justification. Members
of disadvantaged groups face a trade-off between the
psychological benefits of system justification and the
social costs associated with supporting inequality. This
is because system justification is in conflict with motives
for self and group justification for those who are
disadvantaged by the status quo (Jost et al., 2001; see also
O’Brien, Mars, & Eccleston, 2011). For instance, Jost
and Thompson (2000) demonstrated that the justification
of inequality was associated with decreased neuroticism
and increased self-esteem for European Americans, but it
was associated with increased neuroticism and decreased
self-esteem for African Americans (see also O’Brien &
Major, 2005). In a sample of low-income respondents,
Rankin, Jost, andWakslak (2009) observed no differences
between European and African Americans with respect
to the endorsement of system-justifying beliefs. For poor
Whites, system justification was associated with positive
affect, life satisfaction and a subjective sense of security,
meaning and mastery. For poor Blacks, many of these
effects were considerably weakened or even reversed.
Thus, the psychological benefits of system justification
seem to be unevenly distributed in society.
System justification as a “positive illusion”
Insofar as system justification fosters perceptions of
personal control while exaggerating the favourability of
the system, it may be understood in terms of “positive
illusions” (Taylor &Brown, 1988). That is, perceiving the
social system through rose-colored glasses may reflect a
more or less adaptive form of self-deception. Or, as
Lerner (1980) put it, believing that that the world is a
just place is a “fundamental delusion.” For those who
are relatively advantaged, system-justifying beliefs may
simply reflect the ideological elevation of a good situation.
For those who are disadvantaged, such convictions may
reflect false consciousness, defined as “the holding of
false or inaccurate beliefs that are contrary to one’s
own social interest and which thereby contribute to the
maintenance of the disadvantaged position of the self or
the group” (Jost, 1995, p. 400). The notion that system
justification may reflect some degree of self-deception
has received empirical support. In several U.S. samples,
belief in a just world, fair market ideology and political
conservatism have been found to correlate positively
with individual differences in self-deceptive enhancement
(e.g., Jost, Blount, et al., 2003; Jost et al., 2010).
Normativity of system-justifying ideologies
There is evidence that, at least in Capitalist societies,
expressions of system-justifying beliefs are socially
desirable. Alves and Correia (2008) asked Portuguese
students to complete a just world scale (Dalbert, Montada,
& Schmitt, 1987) in a manner that would convey either
a positive or negative social image. Results revealed that
participants scored significantly higher on the belief in a
just world in the positive (vs. negative) image condition.
In a separate study, participants were asked to evaluate a
person who expressed either strong or weak endorsement
of just world ideology. In line with predictions, believers
in a just world received more favourable evaluations than
did non-believers. These results indicate that expressions
of just world beliefs are injunctively normative, insofar as
they are approved of and perceived as socially desirable
(Alves & Correia, 2010; Dalbert et al., 1987; Lerner,
1980; Loo, 2002).
Thus far, our reviewof the research literature on system
justification theory has focused largely on data from
relatively well-developed Capitalist democracies—with
the notable exception of a study of Bolivian children
(Henry & Saul, 2006). The Western skew of this data
base has been cited as a limitation of theory and
research on system justification processes (Wojciszke
& Mikiewicz, 2012). In the remainder of this review, we
seek to overcome this limitation by focusing on studies
conducted in post-Communist societies in Central and
Eastern Europe.
EVIDENCE OF SYSTEM JUSTIFICATION IN
POST-COMMUNIST SOCIETIES
As we have already noted, citizens of post-Communist
societies exhibit a general distrust of social and political
institutions and dramatically lower levels of system
legitimacy, in comparison with citizens of traditionally
capitalist societies (Czapin´ski, 2011; Kluegel, Mason,
et al., 1995; Markova, 2004; Tworzecki, 2008). Does
this mean that system justification theory is simply
inapplicable to Central and Eastern Europe? It seems
unlikely. In this section, we review insights gleaned from
research on ideology and system justification processes
conducted in Central and Eastern Europe, supplementing
our review of the social psychological literature with
public opinion data.
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In particular, our review incorporates previously
unpublished data from the 2012 Polish System Justi-
fication Survey, which was conducted in April 2012
using the ARIADNA internet research panel (Cichocka
& Jost, 2012a). The survey matched the structure of
the population of Polish internet users with regard to
sex, age, education, size of hometown and the use of
leading internet services (as reported by PBI/Megapanel,
March 2012). The sample of 501 internet users con-
sisted of 50.7% women, with ages ranging from 15 to 68
(M= 33.33, SD= 13.37). The survey included measures
of general system justification (Kay& Jost, 2003; α = .83,
M= 2.82, SD= 0.98), political system justification (Jost
et al., 2010; α = .59, M= 3.06, SD= 0.86) and politi-
cal alienation (three items, e.g. “People like me have
no influence on what the government does,” based on
Korzeniowski, 1994; α = .70, M= 5.34, SD= 1.26). We
measured political orientation using three items adapted
from Carney, Jost, Gosling, and Potter (2008; α = .44,
M= 4.95, SD= 1.21) with respect to general, cultural and
economic conservatism (e.g., “Where on the following
scale of political orientation [from extremely liberal to
extremely conservative] would you place yourself [over-
all, in general]?”). The survey also included indicators of
subjective well-being, including self-reported happiness
(e.g., “I am happy,” M= 5.84, SD= 1.95) and internal
self-efficacy (e.g., “There are many things in my life that I
cannot influence,” reverse-scored, M= 4.21, SD= 2.03).
We draw on this data set to illustrate various points
about contemporary post-Communist societies and to
offer comparisons with traditionally Capitalist societies.
Cross-national comparisons concerning the
endorsement of system-justifying beliefs
Scores on system justification scales
The simplest andmost direct way of comparing system
justification in Capitalist and post-Communist societies
is to focus on studies in which the same (albeit translated)
system justification scales were administered in different
countries. While more sophisticated comparisons would
require extensive cross-cultural research involving
nationally representative samples in the nations of
interest, the examination of mean levels of system justifi-
cation in various samples gives us a general sense, at least,
of how the strength of system justification tendencies
might differ across societal and cultural contexts.
To facilitate comparisons of system justification levels
in traditionally Capitalist vs. post-Communist regions we
decided to review studies that administered the general
(Kay & Jost, 2003; see Table 1), economic (Jost &
Thompson, 2000; Table 2) and political (Jost et al., 2010;
3For all statistical analyses reported in the manuscript, a .05 level of significance was used.
Table 3) system justification scales in various societal
contexts. We included all studies reporting scores on at
least one of the three system justification scales. For the
most part, these studies were identified through the use
of PsycINFO, Google Scholar and other search engines.
We also incorporated data from experimental studies in
which results from a baseline or control condition were
reported.We supplemented the list with analyses based on
data from four semesters (2010–2012) of the New York
University (NYU) Introductory Psychology questionnaire
battery, which is administered to undergraduates at
the beginning of every semester. In total, we obtained
scores from 50 samples, 16 of which come from post-
Communist countries. In Tables 1–3, we describe sample
characteristics and report descriptive statistics concerning
system justification scores. To enable comparisons
between different samples, we rescaled each group mean,
dividing it by the scale range to create an overall index of
system justification. For each type of system justification
(general [Table 1], economic [Table 2] and political
[Table 3]), we compared the index for post-Communist
and traditionally Capitalist societies.
With respect to studies conducted in post-Communist
societies, general system justification scores (Kay & Jost,
2003) were lowest in Wojciszke and Mikiewicz’s (2012)
study and highest in a recent survey of Polish students by
Skarz˙yn´ska and Henne (2012), as shown in Table 1. In
the Capitalist context, the lowest scores were observed in
Italian samples (Mosso, Briante, Aiello, & Russo, 2013;
Pacilli, Taurino, Jost, & van der Toorn, 2011). In a study
of perceptions of distributive justice in theworkplace,Van
der Toorn et al. (2010) directly compared scores on system
justification between college students in Hungary and the
U.S. Results revealed somewhat lower levels of system
justification among Hungarian than U.S. respondents.
It can be discerned from Table 2 that only one study
conducted in a post-Communist context administered Jost
and Thompson’s (2000) economic system justification
scale (Jas´ko, 2011). This Polish sample scored slightly
below the scale midpoint but squarely within the range
of scores observed in the U.S. context, where substantial
variability has been observed as a function of race and
other demographic factors. Based on the data summarized
in Table 3, scores on political system justification (Jost
et al., 2010) were near the scale midpoint for U.S.
college students but were slightly lower for Polish
respondents.
Overall, quantitative analyses based on the mean-by-
range index revealed a statistically significant difference
between post-Communist (M= 0.43, SD= 0.03) and
traditionally capitalist (M= 0.51, SD= 0.08) samples
with respect to general system justification (see Table 1),
t (32)= 2.94, p= .01, Cohen’s d= 1.32.3 Even clearer
© 2013 International Union of Psychological Science
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TABLE 2
A cross-national summary of economic system justification scores
Scale Source Data collection year Sample Scale range M SD M/ r
ESJ Hennes et al. (2012) 2012 182 Internet users, U.S. 1–9 4.29 1.28 .48
ESJ Jost and Thompson (2000),
Study 4
1996 122 Black students of University
of Maryland, U.S.
1–9 4.33 0.80 .48
ESJ Burris, Rempel, Munteanu, and
Therrien (2013), Study 1
2011 168 Undergraduates from a large
university in Ontario, Canada
1–9 4.41 0.99 .49
ESJ (15 items) Jas´ko (2011), Study 1.1 2010 128 Adults, Poland 1–9 4.56 0.93 .51
ESJ [NYU battery] 2012 (spring) 408 New York University
undergraduates, U.S.
1–9 4.59 1.03 .51
ESJ [NYU battery] 2011(fall) 483 New York University
undergraduates, U.S.
1–9 4.65 0.97 .52
ESJ [NYU battery] 2011 (spring) 450 New York University
undergraduates, U.S.
1–9 4.78 0.91 .53
ESJ (7 items) Jost et al. (2012), Study 1 2008 108 New York University
students, U.S.
1–7 3.72 0.80 .53
ESJ [NYU battery] 2010 (fall) 475 New York University
undergraduates, U.S.
1–9 4.81 0.97 .53
ESJ Jost and Thompson (2000),
Study 4
1996 364 White students of University
of Maryland, U.S.
1–9 4.92 0.90 .55
Note: ESJ=Economic System Justification Scale (Jost & Thompson, 2000). Studies are listed in order of increasing values for M/r (sample mean
divided by scale range). Because NYU batteries are administered twice a year (once each semester), we specify the semester in which each data
collection occurred.
differences emerged with respect to political system
justification (see Table 3); citizens scored lower in
post-Communist (M= 0.44, SD= 0.03) than traditionally
Capitalist societies (M= 0.50, SD= 0.01), t (9)= 3.84,
p= .004, Cohen’s d= 2.68. We were unable to conduct
comparisons involving economic system justification
because data existed for only one post-Communist
sample. More definitive conclusions would require
more closely matched samples and more sophisticated
meta-analytic strategies. Nevertheless, these informal
comparisons provide some indication that citizens of post-
Communist societies are less likely to regard the social
and political system as fair and legitimate, in comparison
with citizens of traditionally Capitalist societies. At the
same time, there is substantial variability in system
justification scores across studies and respondents.
Comparisons of other indicators of system
justification
Although scores on standard system justification scales
afford the most appropriate basis for comparison, several
studies conducted in the post-Communist context have
employed measures that have been taken to indicate
system support in Western contexts, including (1)
correlations between perceived and desired states of the
social system as well the endorsement of (2) the belief in a
just world, and (3) meritocratic ideology and endorsement
of the protestant work ethic. We summarize the results
of studies using these methods before turning to other
studies that focus on processes of system disengagement,
such as political alienation (Seeman, 1959) and cynicism
(Berkics, 2007).
Correlations between “what is” and “what ought to
be”. One way of thinking about system justification
is in terms of the Panglossian rationalization that
we are living in the “best of all possible worlds”
(Kay, Jost, Mandisodza, Petrocelli, & Johnson, 2007).
System justification, in other words, is associated with
a tendency to see “what is” as “what should be” (Kay
et al., 2009). To create an indirect measure of system
justification, Wojciszke and Mikiewicz (2012) asked
Polish participants to rate a number of social groups (such
as lawyers, politicians and pensioners) in terms of their
material wealth and social status (operationalized in terms
of perceived influence in society). Specifically, they were
asked how well off each of these groups “are” and how
well off they “should be.” These ratings were correlated
for each individual, thereby creating an index of system
justification, with positive correlations indicating greater
legitimation of the status quo and negative correlations
indicating delegitimation. This indirect measure was
positively correlated with scores on a Polish translation
of Kay and Jost’s (2003) general system justification
scale, r (99)= .30, p= .01. With respect to social
status judgments, the perceived-desired correlations were
positive for most of the sample (65%), indicating an
overall system-justifying tendency. However, the pattern
of results was quite different for beliefs about material
wealth. Here, the actual-desired correlation was negative
for 85% of participants. Similarly, negative correlations
between perceptions of wealth and deservingness were
© 2013 International Union of Psychological Science
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TABLE 3
A cross-national summary of political system justification scores
Scale Source Data collection year Sample Scale range M SD M/ r
SJ# (1 item) Cichocka and Jost (2012b) 2009 979 Adults (nationally
representative sample), Poland
1–5 1.98 1.04 .40
SJ# Jas´ko (2011), Study 2.1 2010 124 Jagiellonian University and
AGH University of Science
and Technology students,
Poland
1–9 3.73 1.36 .41
SJ# Jas´ko (2011), Study 1.2 2011 74 Adults, Poland 1–9 3.88 1.35 .43
PSJ Cichocka and Jost (2012a) 2012 501 Internet users, Poland 1–7 3.06 0.86 .44
SJ# Jas´ko (2011), Study 2.2 2010 250 Adults, Poland 1–9 4.10 1.18 .46
SJ# Jas´ko (2011), Study 1.1 2010 128 Adults, Poland 1–9 4.14 1.47 .46
SJ # Jas´ko (2011), Study 1.4 2010 316 Jagiellonian University and
AGH University of Science
and Technology students,
Poland
1–9 4.30 1.13 .48
PSJ [NYU battery] 2012 (spring) 407 New York University
undergraduates, U.S.
1–9 4.31 1.22 .48
PSJ [NYU battery] 2011 (fall) 483 New York University
undergraduates, U.S.
1–9 4.46 1.12 .50
PSJ [NYU battery] 2011 (spring) 450 New York University
undergraduates, U.S.
1–9 4.55 1.18 .51
PSJ [NYU battery] 2010 (fall) 473 New York University
undergraduates, U.S.
1–9 4.58 1.28 .51
Note: SJ# =General System Justification Scale (Kay & Jost, 2003) modified to refer to the political system. PSJ=Political System Justification Scale
(Jost et al., 2010). We included data from an experimental study only if the manipulation exerted no significant main effect on system justification
scores. Studies are listed in order of increasing values forM/r (sample mean divided by scale range). Because NYU batteries are administered twice a
year (once each semester), we specify the semester in which each data collection occurred.
obtained in a nationally representative survey conducted
in 2004 by the Polish Public Opinion Research Center
(Wojciszke, 2007). Thus, in the Polish context at least,
when it comes to material wealth many citizens see “what
is” as “what should never be” (with apologies to Led
Zeppelin).
One explanation for the predominantly negative
correlations between perceived and desired perceptions of
wealth was suggested in a follow-up study conducted by
Wojciszke and Mikiewicz (2012). Using an experimental
design, the researchers measured liking for a target person
after independently manipulating perceptions of his or her
social status and wealth. Whereas high status targets were
evaluated more positively than low status targets, the
oppositewas truewhen it came towealth: rich targetswere
evaluated more negatively than poor targets. Negative
evaluations of rich people were mediated by perceptions
of harmfulness. That is, respondents saw rich individuals
as more harmful and selfish than poor individuals, and
these perceptions predicted more negative evaluations.
Positive evaluations of status, on the other hand, were
mediated by perceptions of competence. It is not entirely
clear whether these beliefs about the characteristics of
rich and poor reflect complementary stereotyping (Kay
& Jost, 2003) or simply the perception that material
wealth is associated with corruption and the exploitation
of personal connections—a perception that seems to
be fairly pervasive in some post-Communist countries,
including Hungary (Hunyady, 2009; Kriedl, 2000), the
Czech Republic (Kriedl, 2000), Estonia (Stephenson,
2000) and Russia (Kriedl, 2000; Stephenson, 2000).
More detailed comparisons involving perceptions of
wealth and poverty in Capitalist and post-Communist
societies are facilitated by the International Justice Project
(Kluegel, Csepeli, et al., 1995), which involved large-
scale social surveys gauging the attitudes of citizens in the
U.S., U.K.,WestGermany, theNetherlands and Japan and
comparing them with the attitudes of citizens in Russia,
Bulgaria, Hungary, East Germany, Estonia, Slovenia and
the former Czechoslovakia. Kluegel, Csepeli, et al. (1995)
focused on societal (i.e., system-level) vs. individualistic
explanations for others’ economic situations. Societal
explanations for wealth included “having connections,”
“having more opportunity,” and blaming the economic
system for allowing the rich to “take unfair advantage.”
Such attributions may reflect the perception that
wealth and success have been obtained illegitimately.
Individualistic explanations included talent/ability, hard
work and dishonesty. Both types of explanations were
prevalent in both types of societies, but respondents from
post-Communist countries (except for East Germany)
tended to evaluate wealth more negatively, believing that
it was associated with dishonesty rather than hard work.
With respect to perceptions of poverty, individuals in
post-Communist societies were more likely than those in
traditionally Capitalist societies to blame the system, but
© 2013 International Union of Psychological Science
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they also tended to endorse individualistic attributions
for poverty (such as drunkenness and immorality). The
fact that citizens from Capitalist and post-Communist
societies subscribe to both societal and individualistic
explanations for economic standing may indicate some
degree of attitudinal ambivalence, insofar as they seem
to justify inequality and, at the same time, question its
legitimacy.
Belief in a just world. The belief in a just world is
considered to be a “fundamental delusion” that—like the
religious belief in karma—leads people to assume that
nearly everything that happens in life is fair and that
people therefore deserve the outcomes they receive (e.g.,
Lerner, 1980). According to Lerner and Miller (1978):
The belief that the world is just enables the individual to
confront his physical and social environment as though
they were stable and orderly. Without such a belief it
would be difficult for the individual to commit himself
to the pursuit of long range goals or even to the socially
regulated behaviour of day to day life. (pp. 1030–1031)
Based on Lerner’s (1980) conception, the need to believe
in a just world is fundamental because it is essential to
the maintenance of the individual’s sense of security and
well-being. The delusional aspect reflects the idea that it
is both false and defensively motivated (cf. Benabou &
Tirole, 2006).
Whereas citizens in Western societies are reluctant
to relinquish just world beliefs (Lerner, 1980; Rubin
& Peplau, 1975), such beliefs are not as prevalent in
post-Communist societies (Macek & Markova, 2004;
Wojciszke, 2004). Just before the fall of Communism,
Dolin´ski (1991, 1993) found that Polish undergraduates
scored substantially lower on a Just World Scale than
did students from the U.S., U.K. and Taiwan. Perhaps
low scores are to be expected immediately following the
transition from a totalitarian system. More surprisingly,
recent studies do not suggest much of an upswing in just
world beliefs, despite increased freedom and economic
development. A representative survey of Poles in 2005
revealed very high scores on a “Belief in Injustice of the
Social World” Scale (Wojciszke & Borkowska, 2007),
with an overall mean of 4.40 on a scale that ranged from
1 to 5. Sample items include: “There is no justice in the
world nowadays,” and “The rich or powerful never get
punished for their misdeeds.” These findings are broadly
consistent with other evidence from Central and Eastern
Europe (Berkics, Ko´bor, & Kara´csonyi, 2006; Hunyady,
2009; Schmitt et al., 2008).
It is important to point out that the need to believe in a
just world and the belief itself are distinguishable (Hafer
& Be`gue, 2005; Lerner, 1980). Low scores on the just
world scale do not necessarily mean that respondents lack
the motivation to regard the world as just and predictable.
It is rather that the need to believe in a just world is
more likely to be satisfied in some circumstances than
others, insofar as the belief is more difficult to sustain in
social contexts in which reward and punishment systems
are experienced as capricious or arbitrary. Consequently,
one would expect that the belief in a just world would be
diminished in nations with poorly functioning legal and
political systems and for members of social groups who
face discrimination and prejudice and find it difficult to
receive fair treatment and opportunities for advancement.
Thus, African Americans score lower than European
Americans on just world scales (Furnham & Procter,
1989) and Catholics score lower than Protestants in
Northern Ireland (Glennon, Joseph, & Hunter, 1993).
In Capitalist societies, the belief in a just world appears
to serve a system-justifying function (Hafer & Be`gue,
2005; Jost et al., 2001; Kay & Jost, 2003; Oldmeadow
& Fiske, 2007). Recent evidence from post-Communist
societies tells a similar story. For instance, Berkics (2007)
observed a significant positive association between scores
on belief in a just world and general system justification
scales in a sample of Hungarian adults. Wojciszke
and Mikiewicz (2012), too, found that the perception
of society as generally unjust—as measured with the
Belief in Injustice of the Social World Scale (Wojciszke
& Borkowska, 2007)—was negatively associated with
system justification in Poland.
Meritocratic ideology and protestant work ethic.
According to data from the World Values Survey,
approximately 60%ofAmericans believe that poor people
are lazy and lack will power and that hard work pays off
in the long run, whereas only 30% of Europeans hold
these beliefs (Benabou & Tirole, 2006). Conversely, 60%
of Europeans believe that it is difficult to escape poverty
and that success is determined by luck rather than effort,
whereas only 30% of Americans do (Alesina, Glaeser,
& Sacerdote, 2001). There is a close correspondence
between patterns of public opinion and actual levels of
redistribution within each type of society (Alesina et al.,
2001), suggesting that the beliefs either influence or are
post hoc justifications of public policies. Although efforts
to implement meritocratic principles in post-Communist
labour markets have been made, support for meritocratic
ideology is fairly weak in this region (Mason, 1995;
Lewicka, 2006; but see Van der Toorn et al., 2010). This
is somewhat surprising, given that meritocratic arguments
provided one basis for criticism of the socialist system
(Jasiecki, 2010).
In an article addressing adolescents’ beliefs about
justice, Flanagan et al. (2003) proposed a distinction
between “security societies,” in which the state directly
addresses citizens’ economic needs by providing social
welfare, and “opportunity societies” that accord a much
smaller role to public investment. In security societies,
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justice is generally understood in terms of equal outcomes
for all, whereas the principle of equity, which holds that
outcomes should be proportional to one’s input, prevails
in opportunity societies. According to Flanagan et al.
(2003), post-Communist countries (Russia, Bulgaria,
Hungary and the Czech Republic) have tended to remain
security societies, whereas theUnited States andAustralia
have long been opportunity societies. Unsurprisingly,
adolescents from the two types of societies seem to differ
in their perceptions of the system.Whereas American and
Australian adolescents tend to believe that their societies
are based on meritocratic principles, adolescents from
post-Communist societies are more likely to expect a
“package of social entitlements to citizens” (Flanagan
et al., 2003, p. 721).
These results are by and large consistent with data from
the 1992 Social Inequality Module of the International
Social Survey Project (Kunovich & Slomczynski, 2007).
Immediately after the fall of the Communist system
in Eastern Europe, meritocratic attitudes were more
enthusiastically endorsed in Western countries (the
U.K., Canada, Australia, New Zealand) than in post-
Communist countries (Hungary, Poland, East Germany,
the former Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria, with Russia
showing the lowest levels of meritocratic endorsement).
Interestingly, citizens from three Western countries
(Italy, Norway and West Germany) were also fairly
dismissive of meritocratic principles, suggesting a pattern
of public opinion that is more complex than a simple
Capitalist/post-Communist distinction would suggest.
Scepticism about meritocracy and the protestant work
ethic in post-Communist societies is understandable given
the nature of the relationship between work effort and
payment in the socialist system. The socialist system
guaranteed full employment, with wages that were fairly
equal and not particularly tied to individual skills, effort or
merit—regardless of whether employees were “standing
up or lying down,” as the popular Polish saying had
it. Thus, Hunyady (2002) has suggested that a principle
of “contraselection” (whereby the system promotes and
rewards those individuals who are especially ill-suited to
lead) was perceived bymanyHungarian employees. None
of this is to suggest that the workplace was chaotic or
unruly under the socialist system; on the contrary, order
and stability were carefully maintained. Nevertheless,
some citizens in Communist states developed disdain for
work effort, insofar as it rarely seemed to produce positive
outcomes for the individual (Dolin´ski, 1993).
At the same time, a study of public opinion in theCzech
Republic suggested that individualistic and meritocratic
values have been endorsed more enthusiastically than
egalitarian values over the past 20 years (Smith &Mateˇju˚,
2012; see also Gavreliuc, 2012; Schwartz & Bardi, 1997).
Despite some misgivings, citizens of post-Communist
states continue to believe that a market-based economy is
crucial for economic development in the region (Arts &
Gijsberts, 1998; Karpin´ski, 2010; Mason, 1995). These
conflicting results do not allowus tomake clear judgments
about the endorsement of meritocratic beliefs in post-
Communist countries, and it is important to keep in mind
that the relationship between system justification and
meritocratic ideology might well depend upon specific
features of the societal context.
Political alienation and cynicism. A number of
additional comparisons between Western and post-
Communist states are afforded by studies of political
alienation. According to Citrin, McClosky, Shanks, and
Sniderman (1975):
To be politically alienated is to feel a relatively enduring
sense of estrangement from existing social institutions,
values and leaders. At the far end of the continuum, the
politically alienated feel themselves outsiders, trapped in
an alien political order; they would welcome fundamental
changes in the ongoing regime. By contrast, the politically
allegiant feel themselves an integral part of the political
system, they belong to it psychologically as well as legally.
Allegiant citizens evaluate the regime positively, see it as
morally worthy, and believe it has a legitimate claim to
their loyalty. (p. 3, emphasis added)
Defined in this way, political alienation is virtually
the opposite of system justification. To investigate the
nature of the empirical relationship between political
alienation and system justification, we analyzed data
from the 2012 Polish System Justification Survey. A
hierarchical regression model included gender, age,
education, size of hometown and political orientation
as adjustment variables in Step 1 and both general and
political forms of system justification in Step 2. None of
the adjustment variables exerted a significant effect on
political alienation, F(5, 495)= 0.36, p= .88, R2 = .004,
but both general (B=−0.54, SE= 0.06, β =−.42,
p< .001) and political (B=−0.41, SE= 0.07, β =−.28,
p< .001) system justification were significantly and
negatively associated with political alienation, F(7,
493)= 48.97, R2 = .41.
Seeman (1959) distinguished five fundamental aspects
of alienation: powerlessness, meaninglessness, norm-
lessness, isolation and self-estrangement. There is a
good deal of evidence suggesting that citizens in most
post-Communist states experienced a strong sense of
alienation, frustration and pointlessness in the early
1990s, immediately following system change (Mason,
1995). In Poland, feelings of powerlessness, estrange-
ment and political disorientation were especially acute
during the system transition period (Korzeniowski, 1993,
1994; Radkiewicz, 2007). It may be that alienation was
an unavoidable result of the collapse of the legitimacy
and stability of the Communist system, as Havel (1990a)
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suggested in the passage we quoted at the beginning of
this article.
Closely related to the concept of alienation is social
cynicism, which may be defined very broadly as “a
negative view of human nature, a biased view against
some groups of people, a mistrust of social institutions,
and a disregard of ethical means for achieving an
end” (Leung et al., 2002, p. 292). It would seem that
such views are especially prevalent in post-Communist
societies (Boski, 2009) and are associated with decreased
subjective well-being (Bond et al., 2004). Berkics (2007)
described political cynicism as the opposite of system
justification. Whereas system justification involves a
fairly optimistic, favourable view of the social system as a
whole (Napier & Jost, 2008), social cynicism involves the
opposite—negativity and pessimism about the system. At
the same time, social cynicism is probably an independent
construct that is often related—but not equivalent— to
low system justification. It is important to point out
that (1) active forms of system rejection, such as those
involved in protest behaviour (e.g., Jost et al., 2012), can
be sincere, constructive and idealistic—and thus far from
cynical, and (2) it is possible to be a cynical supporter
of the status quo (e.g., defending corrupt institutions and
practices as unavoidable if not just).
System-justifying processes in the
post-communist context
Most of the studies we have summarized suggest that the
overall degree of system justification is lower in post-
Communist than traditionally Capitalist societies. The
difference seems to be especially acute with respect to the
perceived legitimacy of the political system. However,
the possibility remains that the motivation to justify
the system operates more subtly and indirectly in post-
Communist societies. Here we highlight research findings
that bear on a wider range of system-justifying processes
and outcomes in post-Communist societies. We also
address the theoretical and practical question of whether
the social psychological antecedents and consequences of
system justification are similar to those typically obtained
in Western societies.
Responses to system criticism
Some of the most compelling evidence for the
existence of system justification motivation comes from
research on defensive responses to system criticism or
threat (e.g., Banfield, Kay, Cutright, Wu, & Fitzsimons,
2011; Jost et al., 2010; Ledgerwood, Mandisodza, Jost,
& Pohl, 2011). In a study involving Hungarian citizens,
Jost, Blount, et al. (2003) exposed participants to passages
criticizing either the former (Communist) or current
(Capitalist) system. Interestingly, both types of system
threat increased justification of the current economic
system—but only for participants who scored relatively
high in self-deception. These findings suggest that (as in
Capitalist societies) support for the free market system is
partially motivated by defensive concerns.
Complementary stereotyping
The 2009 Polish Prejudice Survey included several
items that facilitate the analysis of complementary
stereotyping with respect to ethnic minorities in Poland
(Bilewicz, Bukowski, Cichocka, Winiewski, & Wo´jcik,
2009). Results revealed that perceptions of ethnic
minorities as warm but incompetent or competent but
cold were positively associated with system justification
scores, as hypothesized. These results are consistent
with the notion that complementary stereotypes of social
groups contribute to the perceived legitimacy and stability
of the status quo (e.g., Glick & Fiske, 2001; Jost & Kay,
2005; Jost et al., 2005; Kay & Jost, 2003).
Other studies have focused on negative evaluations of
those who are wealthy in post-Communist societies (Hun-
yady, 2009; Kriedl, 2000; Stephenson, 2000; Wojciszke,
2007; Wojciszke & Mikiewicz, 2012). Such results are
typically interpreted as reflecting system delegitimation,
insofar as citizens presumably regard the system more
negatively to the extent that the rich are seen as corrupt and
dishonest. At the same time, it is conceivable that these
evaluations reflect complementary stereotyping, so that an
“illusion of equality” is maintained by representing those
who are poor as more honest or moral than those who are
rich (see Kay & Jost, 2003). More direct evidence of the
system-justifying function of complementary stereotypes
in post-Communist society comes from experiments by
Kay, Czaplin´ski, and Jost (2009), who found that leftist
respondents in Poland exhibited stronger support for the
societal status quo following exposure to complementary
(“poor but happy,” “rich but miserable”) representations,
whereas rightists exhibited stronger support for the status
quo following exposure to non-complementary (“poor
and dishonest,” “rich and honest”) representations.
Palliative benefits of system justification
It would appear that the endorsement of system-
justifying beliefs serves a palliative function in post-
Communist as well as traditionally capitalist societies.
For instance, several studies conducted in Poland reveal
positive correlations between system justification and
subjective well-being (Cisłak & Skarz˙yn´ska, 2010;
Dziugieł & Cisłak, 2010, cited in Cisłak & Wo´jcik,
2011; Skarz˙yn´ska & Henne, 2008). Dziugieł and Cisłak
(2010; cited in Cisłak & Wo´jcik, 2011) found that the
relationship between system justification and subjective
well-being in Poland was mediated by feelings of
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personal efficacy and personal coherence. In addition,
system justification was related to perceptions of other
people as trustworthy and benevolent (Wojciszke &
Borkowska, 2007). Napier and Jost (2008) included data
from the Czech Republic and Slovakia in their study of
the relationship between right-wing ideology and self-
reported happiness and found that it was mediated by the
endorsement of meritocratic beliefs.
Weused the 2012Polish System Justification Survey to
investigate the relationship between system justification
and self-reported happiness in Poland (Cichocka & Jost,
2012a). We included demographic variables (gender, age,
education, size of hometown) and political orientation
as predictors in Step 1. The model was marginally
significant, F(5, 495)= 2.02, p= .07, R2 = .02), and
political conservatism was the only significant predictor
of happiness (B= 0.18, SE= 0.07, β = .11, p= .01). In
Step 2, we added both general and political system
justification to the model, F(7, 493)= 3.30, p= .002,
R2 = .03. General system justification scores were
indeed positively related to feelings of happiness
(B= 0.35, SE= 0.12, β = .18, p= .004). In this model
there was no reliable association between political
system justification and happiness (B=−0.06, SE= 0.14,
β =−.03, p= .68).
We also observed that—as in U.S. samples (Jost,
Nosek, & Gosling, 2008)—political conservatism was
a significant predictor of system justification (B= 0.09,
SE= 0.04, β = .11, p= .02; F(5, 495)= 2.67, p= .02,
R2 = .03). And, replicating previous work in West-
ern societies (e.g., Napier & Jost, 2008), the effect of
conservatism on happiness was reduced when system jus-
tification was included in the model (B= 0.15, SE= 0.07,
β = .10, p= .03). Bootstrapping analysis (Preacher &
Hayes, 2008) confirmed that general system justification
significantly mediated the effect of political conservatism
on happiness (95% CI: 0.004–0.068; 10,000 bootstrap
samples; unadjusted κ2 = .02, Preacher & Kelley, 2011).
The notion that system justification has palliative
consequences is also supported by studies that measured
system legitimation and delegitimation in other ways.
In a representative survey of Romanians conducted
in 2005, Cernat (2010) observed that support for the
(democratic) government in power and rejection of
the previous system were positively associated with
subjective well-being. Endorsement of the belief in a
just world was positively associated with subjective
well-being in research conducted in Hungary (Dalbert
& Katona-Sallay, 1996) and Slovakia (Dzuka & Dalbert,
4We included questions about disruptive and nondisruptive forms of political participation in the Polish System Justification Survey (Cichocka &
Jost, 2012a). However, the analyses did not yield clear conclusions. We found that political system justification was negatively associated with most
forms of activism—in line with the results of Jost et al. (2012). At the same time, general system justification was positively associated with disruptive
forms of political participation, as well as some forms of nondisruptive participation. These inconsistent results may be attributable to the fact that we
asked respondents about engaging in various forms of political behaviour rather than their willingness to take action on behalf of specific causes or
movements (which may be motivated by pro- or anti-system sentiments).
2006). Conversely, political alienation in Poland was
associated with pessimism, anxiety and depression
(Korzeniowski, 1993).
System rejection and system change in
post-Communist societies
Relatively weak levels of support for the status quo
in post-Communist societies might inspire some hope for
change on behalf of those who have been disappointed by
the harsh economic realities ushered in by the Capitalist
system. Along similar lines, Jost et al. (2010) conjectured
that:
The system justification goal will finally be abandoned
when justifying the system no longer satisfies epistemic,
existential, or relational needs. This may occur when the
status quo itself offers no stability or certainty or may even
be regarded as a source of threat rather than reassurance,
or when it has become counter-normative to stick with an
old regime when a new one is gaining in popularity.
Under circumstances such as these, the motivational
impetus of system justification tendencies would be low
and people might even work to change the status quo.
(pp. 13–14)
Consistent with this general idea, three studies conducted
in the U.S., U.K. and Greece confirmed that decreased
system justification was indeed associated with greater
willingness to engage in both disruptive and nondisruptive
forms of social protest and collective action (Jost et al.,
2012).
Findings such as these might suggest that dissatisfac-
tionwith the status quowouldmotivate increased political
participation in the post-Communist region. This does not
seem to have transpired so far: consistently low levels
of political engagement are reported in the region (e.g.,
Mason, Nelson, & Szklarski, 1991; Tworzecki, 2008).
Moreover, political alienation—although it is related to
low system justification—does not seem to predict politi-
cal participation (Korzeniowski, 1994).4 On the contrary,
political cynicism is generally associated with political
disengagement, such as abstinence from voting (Byn-
ner & Ashford, 1994) and a failure to take constructive
approaches to the solution of social problems (Bond et al.,
2004).
A plausible explanation for the lack of a clear
relationship between system-level attitudes and political
participation is that system delegitimation might be
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accompanied by low levels of political efficacy (Long,
1978). Those who are alienated might be dissatisfied
with the system, but they also feel helpless and have
no confidence that they are able to affect meaningful
political outcomes. Feelings of political efficacy are
essential for political participation (e.g., Gonza´lez et al.,
2005; Mannarini, Legittimo, & Talo´, 2008; Zimmerman,
1989). However, many citizens of Central and Eastern
Europe continue to feel that it is impossible to change
things (Gavreliuc, 2012; Kochanowicz, 2004; Mason,
1995). Presumably, some degree of system justification
is required for the individual to believe that the system
will be responsive to the needs, interests, and efforts of
its citizenry. In the 2012 survey of Polish internet users,
we found that feelings of efficacy were indeed positively
associated with general and (to a lesser extent) political
forms of system justification (Cichocka & Jost, 2012a).
Believing that individuals have little control over
their fates and outcomes in post-Communist societies
(Gavreliuc, 2012) has been tied to a sense of “entitlement”
with respect to governmental provisions (Lewicka,
2001). Such expectations that the government will
take care of its citizens are generally quite different
from system justification tendencies, which—at least
in the Capitalist context—are typically manifested
in terms of faith in meritocracy and a commitment
to work hard on behalf of the system (Ledgerwood
et al., 2011). A sense of entitlement to governmental
benefits, on the other hand, may be accompanied by
the conviction that “others” should take action on one’s
own behalf (Lewicka, 2001). Low system justification
in post-Communist societies, then, might be associated
with higher expectations of governmental support and,
at the same time, decreased political participation
(Kochanowicz, 2004; Lewicka, 2006). Feelings of
entitlement (and tendencies to complain about the system)
are associated with political alienation, low self-esteem
and personal dissatisfaction (Z˙emojtel-Piotrowska &
Piotrowski, 2009). These findings suggest that entitlement
beliefs (in relation to the government) should not
be considered system-justifying in the post-Communist
context. It may also be the case that citizens of post-
Communist societies exhibit signs of “depressive realism”
(cf. Benabou & Tirole, 2006; Gavreliuc, 2012)—as well
as apathy, disengagement and perceived helplessness
when it comes to changing the status quo. Future research
in Central and Eastern Europe would do well to explore
the causes and consequences of political efficacy more
directly as well as the bases of accuracy and inaccuracy
when it comes to the perception of system changeability.
For the most part, empirical research on system-
justifying processes in post-Communist societies pro-
duces patterns of results that are quite similar to those
typically obtained in Western societies. For instance,
we observed fairly clear evidence of motivated system
defence in response to system criticism or threat; comple-
mentary stereotypic differentiation between groups that
are higher and lower in social standing; and palliative
benefits of endorsing system-justifying beliefs and ide-
ologies. However, the existing research fails to replicate
the clear negative relationship between system justifi-
cation and participation in protest and other forms of
collective action observed in the U.S. context. We will
return to this issue in exploring directions for future
research.
EXPLANATIONS FOR LOW LEVELS OF
SYSTEM JUSTIFICATION IN POST-COMMUNIST
SOCIETIES
Studies addressing the palliative function of system
justification clearly demonstrate that legitimation of the
status quo is associated with happiness and greater
life satisfaction, as well as other positive social and
psychological outcomes. Given all of these hedonic
benefits, it may be useful to consider why support for the
system remains so low in post-Communist societies. At
least three explanations,which are notmutually exclusive,
may be suggested. First, some systems might be harder to
justify than others. It is possible that system justification in
post-Communist societies is lower because the status quo
is, in fact, worse, in these societies. Second, it is possible
that when the political system lacks legitimacy, citizens
might turn to other social systems in order to satisfy their
system justification motives. Third, overt declarations of
support for the system might be suppressed by cultural
norms of criticism, complaint and cynicism that have long
characterized Central and Eastern European societies.
An unjustifiable system?
System justification, as we have already noted, has the
potential to satisfy the individual’s basic epistemic,
existential and relational needs by strengthening the
conviction that one lives and works in a predictable,
safe and supportive environment (Jost & Hunyady, 2005;
Jost, Ledgerwood, et al., 2008). By internalizing and
adhering to the principles that govern the overarching
system, individuals can develop a sense of self-efficacy,
controllability and security. From a social psychological
perspective, it is probably no accident that certainty,
transparency, and accountability promote trust in system-
level authorities and institutions (Sztompka, 1998).
In a well-functioning democracy, internalizing the
norms of the system enables citizens to make predictions
about the future and link their efforts to reliable outcomes.
By contrast, an authoritarian regime functions arbitrarily
andmakes it nearly impossible to learn the rules governing
the system and to develop a sense of efficacy or control
over one’s outcomes (Arendt, 1973; Markova, 2004).
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In such cases, the need for system justification may
exist, but it is unlikely to be satisfied adequately. Post-
Communist societies, we have seen, are characterized
by persistently high levels of anomie (A˚dnanes, 2007;
Gavreliuc, 2012; Korzeniowski, 1994; Sztompka, 1993),
defined as “a feeling that the world and oneself are adrift,
wandering, lacking of clear rules and stable moorings”
(McClosky & Schaar, 1965, p. 19). Research on the
psychological correlates of social anomie reveals that it is
related to cynicism, alienation, and political impotence,
as well as poorer life satisfaction, greater anxiety and
pessimism (McClosky & Schaar, 1965). The state of
anomie thus resembles the psychological state of “learned
helplessness” (Seligman, 1975), which may have been
acquired under the old system but is difficult to overcome
in the new system.
In fact, some individuals living under Communism
might have developed a defensively pessimistic belief in
a predictably unjust socio-political system (cf. Furnham,
1993). For instance, Dolin´ski’s (1993) study of Polish
students suggested that believing in the injustice of
the system may have served an ego-protective (i.e.,
self-handicapping) function, even though such beliefs
also implied low self-efficacy. It is possible, in any
case, that perceiving the system as entirely illegitimate
is preferable to perceiving it as generating random,
capricious outcomes (e.g., Kay, Shepherd, Blatz, Chua,
& Galinsky, 2010).
Presumably, economic crises and instability—along
with high rates of corruption before, during and after the
transition to Capitalism—also contribute to scepticism
about the legitimacy of the present system. Overall, we
suspect that citizens of post-Communist societies are, to
some extent, torn between nostalgia for the old (frustrating
but familiar) system and the newer Capitalist system that
has been taking hold but has brought with it completely
new problems and challenges.
The justification of alternative systems
If the overarching political system clearly fails to meet
its citizens’ basic needs, people are likely to “look
elsewhere” to satisfy their system justificationmotivation.
We have observed that the discrepancy between
respondents from post-Communist and traditionally
Capitalist societies seems to be greater with respect to
political system justification than general (social) system
justification. It is also possible that citizens of post-
Communist societies would defend and justify higher
order political systems, such as the European Union
(E.U.). Despite the international economic crisis presently
facing the Eurozone, the E.U. enjoys greater trust and
legitimation than the national governments and legislative
bodies of its member states (Eurobarometer, 2011).
Furthermore, Jas´ko (2011) found that Polish citizens
scored higher on a measure of E.U. system justification
(adapting four items from the Kay & Jost, 2003 scale)
than they typically score on measures of national system
justification. Legitimating the E.U. system may help to
satisfy the epistemic, existential and relational needs
of those post-Communist countries that are part of the
EU-27, and it might even serve a similar (anticipatory)
function for people in other countries who aspire to
membership in the E.U.
System justification motivation can be also satisfied
through ideological investment in religious institutions.
Religious belief systems and practices provide a
subjective sense of coherence, predictability, order,
security and belongingness that may be comparable to
the provisions of other more secular forms of system
justification. Religious dogma provides rules, norms and
guidance for the conduct of individual lives and enables
adherents to believe that they live in a society that
is orderly, legitimate and just (e.g., see Jost et al.,
2013). There is evidence suggesting that ideological
commitment to political and religious institutions are
both capable of addressing the individual’s epistemic
needs for control and predictability and are therefore
psychologically substitutable (Kay et al., 2010). Public
opinion surveys reveal high levels of religiosity in at least
some parts of the post-Communist region (with some
noteworthy exceptions, such as the Czech Republic;
White, Miller, Grødeland, & Oates, 2000). However,
direct evidence for the notion that most individuals place
their trust and confidence in either God or the government
has yet to emerge in the post-Communist context (cf. Kay
et al., 2010).
Normativity of complaining about the system
A final explanation for the apparent lack of system
justification can be derived from research on social
norms. In Western societies, expressions of system-
justifying beliefs are socially normative (Alves &
Correia, 2008, 2010), and expressions of system criticism
or complaint are counter-normative (e.g., Diekman &
Goodfriend, 2007; Kaiser, Dyrenforth, & Hagiwara,
2006). These patterns may be related to more general
norms of communicating optimism and satisfaction in
these societies (Dolin´ski, 1993). In post-Communist
societies, however, pessimism, fatalism and “cultures of
complaining” are more prevalent than optimism and the
profession of satisfaction with one’s own life (Dolin´ski,
1993; Sztompka, 1993; Szymko´w, Wojciszke, & Baryła,
2003; Wojciszke & Baryła, 2005).
Research on Polish culture in particular suggests the
existence of a social norm that supports negativity—that
is, a tendency to perceive the world as malevolent
rather than benevolent (Lewicka, 2006; Wojciszke, 2004;
Wojciszke & Baryła, 2005). Although Poles report being
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reasonably happy with their personal lives, they routinely
complain about social and political events (Wojciszke,
2004). A norm of negativity has also been observed
in other post-Communist societies, including Hungary
(Hunyady, 2009) and the Czech Republic (Macek &
Markova, 2004). It is a popular Hungarian adage, for
instance, that “an optimist is a person who is poorly
informed.” One fourth of Hungarian survey respondents
reported becoming more depressed and pessimistic over
the past 5–10 years (Hunyady, 2009). To the extent that
negativity might reflect unfortunate realities, citizens
of post-Communist societies may exhibit “depressive
realism” (Alloy & Abramson, 1979)—as opposed to
“positive illusions” (Taylor & Brown, 1988) or “false
consciousness” (Jost, 1995).
Consistent with the “culture of complaint” thesis,
some evidence suggests that cynicism and negativity
are socially reinforced in Central and Eastern Europe.
A Polish study, for example, revealed that interaction
partners who complained about politics and social
services were seen as nicer and more intelligent, in
comparison with more upbeat conversational partners,
and the interactions themselves were perceived as more
genuine and valuable (Szymko´w et al., 2003). If it is true
that social cynicism and alienation are socially desirable
ways of relating to the system, any system-justifying
tendencies that might arise are likely to be inhibited and
suppressed by a culture of complaint. This possibility is
consistent with empirical observations that the tendency
to complain is negatively correlated with general
system justification (Skarz˙yn´ska, 2009) and positively
correlated with perceptions of the world as unjust
(Wojciszke, 2004). While such observations do not
support causal inferences, it seems reasonable to suggest
that negativity norms would contribute to lower levels
of system justification, at least when it comes to explicit
declaration.
ARE SYSTEM JUSTIFICATION LEVELS RISING
IN POST-COMMUNIST SOCIETIES?
Although certain indicators of perceived justice and sys-
tem legitimacy point to lower levels of system justification
in post-Communist than traditionally Capitalist societies,
some evidence suggests that the discrepancies are shrink-
ing as the “new” status quo consolidates. For instance,
panel data from Poland reveal that satisfaction with the
current system has been increasing over the last two
decades (e.g., Czapin´ski, 2011). And, as noted above,
survey data from Poland indicate that general system jus-
tification scores collected between 2008 and 2012 were a
bit higher than in 2005 (see Table 1).5
5At the same time, public opinion data from Hungary suggests that societal optimism and faith in the system decreased from 2008 to 2012. During
the same period, feelings of pessimism and injustice with regard to politics and economics increased (Hunyady, 2012).
This is not to say that nostalgia for the old system
has entirely vanished (cf. Hogwood, 2000). According to
a Polish survey conducted in 2010, 64% of respondents
evaluated their lives before the transition to Capitalism
positively, whereas only 7% evaluated them negatively
(Prusik, 2011; cf. Boski, 2009). In 2000, 61% of Polish
respondents stated that their lives had been easier before
the transition (Czapin´ski & Panek, 2000). Although this
figure dropped to 41% in 2009 (Czapin´ski & Panek, 2009;
Prusik, 2011), these percentages seem high given the
intensity of antipathy toward Communism immediately
following system change. Perhaps gradual changes are to
be expected. Research on long-term shifts in societal
norms and values suggests that changes take place
very slowly from one generation to the next, insofar
as children’s life experiences are substantially different
from those of their parents (Inglehart & Baker, 2000;
Schwartz & Bardi, 1997).
There remains, in other words, considerable
ambivalence about the present and former systems in
post-Communist societies, at least when it comes to
aggregate levels of public opinion. Both the free market
and socialist economic systems receive some ideological
support, suggesting that these societies remain torn
between a historical allegiance to their socialist legacy
and the more recently established capitalist system. The
simultaneous affirmation of egalitarian and meritocratic
ideologies is sometimes characterized as a form of “split
consciousness” (Arts&Gijsberts, 1998; Kluegel, Csepeli,
et al., 1995; Van der Toorn et al., 2010) that may reflect
cross-generational differences in experiences and values
(Inglehart & Baker, 2000). Attitudinal conflict—and
nostalgic sentiments about the former system in
particular—seem to be greatest for those who are rela-
tively low in social or economic status (Arts & Gijsberts,
1998; Kluegel & Smith, 1986; Smith & Mateˇju˚, 2012).
Such individuals may experience a conflict between ego
and group justification motives that contribute to egali-
tarian preferences, on one hand, and system justification
motives to support meritocratic ideology associated with
Capitalism, on the other (Jost et al., 2001). Over time—as
the Capitalist system becomes the only one that citizens
are personally familiar with—it is conceivable that even
those who are relatively disadvantaged will come to
embrace it more unequivocally, as in the West (e.g., Jost,
Pelham, et al., 2003). Along these lines, the results of
a nationally representative survey of Romanian citizens
by Cernat (2010) found that socio-economic status was
inversely related to satisfaction with capitalism and
democracy as well as trust in and support for various polit-
ical institutions, including Parliament, the presidency,
and the government as a whole (cf. Brandt, 2013).
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DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
What is the opposite of system justification?
Our review of studies conducted in post-Communist
societies leads us to conclude that there are at least two
different ways of conceptualizing low levels of system
justification from a social psychological perspective.
One possibility is that—when the political system
fails to satisfy epistemic, existential and relational
needs—individuals might derive some modicum of
comfort in perceiving the system as predictably
malevolent and unjust (e.g., Dolin´ski, 1993; Furnham,
1993). While this “solution” is unlikely to satisfy
existential needs for safety and security, it might provide
some semblance of certainty, confidence and a shared
sense of social reality (consistent with the “culture of
complaint”).
Another, quite different possibility is that low system
justification would be linked to perceptions of the social
or political system as sanctioning outcomes that are
completely random or meaningless (e.g., Kay et al.,
2010). Such perceptions are likely to be accompanied by
subjective states that are symptomatic of social anomie
and political alienation (Citrin et al., 1975; Korzeniowski,
1994; McClosky & Schaar, 1965; Seeman, 1959;
Sztompka, 1993), which would suggest that important
psychological needs, such as those that underlie system
justification motivation, are entirely frustrated. The
cognitive-motivational analysis of system delegitimation
requires (and deserves) further theoretical and empirical
elaboration. We hope that the present article takes a first
step in the right direction.
System justification and political participation:
A curvilinear relationship?
Studies conducted in Western societies suggest that low
levels of system justification encourage participation in
collective action and other efforts to remedy injustice
and effect social change (see Jost et al., 2010, 2012;
Wakslak, Jost, Tyler, & Chen, 2007). So far, this result
has not been replicated in research carried out in the
post-Communist context, providing an opportunity to
develop a more sophisticated theoretical model of the
relationship between system justification and political
participation. We may speculate that system justification
exerts two opposing effects on political engagement. On
one hand, system justification should be negatively related
to political engagement, insofar as system justification
reflects or contributes to a decreased desire for social and
political change (i.e., satisfaction with the status quo).
On the other hand, there is reason to think that system
justification would be positively associated with a sense
of political efficacy, insofar as some degree of faith in
the system is needed to believe that the system will
be responsive to individual efforts to “reform it from
within”, and this should encourage rather than discourage
political engagement (cf. Skarz˙yn´ska & Henne, 2012).
Because of these two opposing processes, motivation for
political participation might be greatest at intermediate
(rather than very high or low) levels of system justification
(cf. McGuire, 1985, for a parallel argument concerning
other social psychological variables). We have indeed
obtained some tentative support for the hypothesis that a
curvilinear (i.e., quadratic) relationship holds between
system justification and normative forms of political
participation. Analyzing data from the 2009 Polish
Prejudice Survey, we observed that citizens who endorsed
political system justification to a moderate extent were
indeed most likely to vote in political elections. Similarly,
we re-analyzed data from a study of U.S. college
students and discovered that the likelihood of signing
a petition against the governmental bailout of Wall Street
was greatest at intermediate levels of economic system
justification (Cichocka & Jost, 2012b).
CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this reviewwe have sought to shed much-needed social
psychological light on system justification processes
in post-Communist European societies. We concluded
that system justification seems to possess similar social,
cognitive andmotivational antecedents and consequences
in Capitalist and post-Communist societies, sustaining the
broad applicability of the theory. At the same time, direct
comparisons of system justification scores and levels
of endorsement of various system-justifying beliefs and
ideologies suggest that support for the system is indeed
lower in post-Communist societies. Such results may be
understood, at least in part, in terms of cultural norms
of negativity and complaint that remain prevalent in
Central and Eastern Europe. At the same time, there is
evidence that system justification is generally on the rise
in post-Communist societies, as the consolidation of the
Capitalist system proceeds apace, and nostalgia for the
former system seems to be on the decline.
Our analysis of the social and psychological con-
comitants of low system justification suggests that the
dispelling of ideological illusions about the system might
serve the goal of accuracy, but it probably carries with it a
number of pitfalls. As Elms (1976) put it, the “perception
of government maltreatment is one example of how an
effort to evaluate one’s world as accurately as possible,
and to organize one’s observations into a meaningful
model of reality, can lead to alienation” (p. 22). The
lack of system justification is associated with a variety
of negative social psychological consequences, includ-
ing decreased subjective well-being. Unfortunately, it
would appear that low levels of system justification do
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not necessarily inspire attempts to change the frustrating
circumstances of the present. Further research is needed
to determine the nature and extent of system justification
that may be considered optimal from the standpoint of
subjective—and perhaps objective—well-being. This is
a daunting scientific challenge that would require us to
discover ways in which basic needs for security, control
and belongingness could be satisfied without fostering an
exaggerated sense of dependence on or subjugation to a
social system that might well disappoint us, perhaps even
profoundly—as so many have throughout the course of
human civilization.
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